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ABSTRACT 
 
THE CHALLENGES OF PROVIDING HOMEOWNERSHIP FOR WORKING FAMILIES: 
A Case Study in Pine Knolls Development, Chapel Hill, NC 
(Under the direction of Roberto G. Quercia)  
 
Working families increasingly find it difficult to become homeowners in the communities 
they serve.  While federal housing policy promotes homeownership, most federal resources are 
targeted to assist low-income households.  Without access to subsidies, developers of workforce 
housing cannot increase homeownership opportunities for moderate-income households. A case study 
of Pine Knolls Development in Chapel Hill, NC examines the challenges facing one affordable 
housing developer and demonstrates the importance of government-sponsored financial assistance.  
As communities create new policies and programs to increase homeownership options for working 
families, some emerging best practices are considered. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
What the world eminently requires is some wise adjustments, some remodeling of the 
Social machinery, diminishing its friction whereby every person willing to work shall 
assuredly have work to do, and the just reward of that work in the articles most 
essential to his sustenance and comfort.  
– Horace Greeley, in “An Address to the Printers of New York,” January 17, 1850 
 
Generations of working Americans have viewed homeownership as the fruit of their labor, if 
not the culmination of the American Dream.   Supported by the federal government, the nation’s 
homeownership rate rose to a record 69 percent in 2004.  At the same time, many local markets 
witnessed record-high property values, especially in rapidly growing areas like Southern California, 
Nevada and Florida.   This rapid housing price appreciation far exceeded increases in household 
income and wealth (Wolff 2007).   Consequently, access to reasonably priced housing, and especially 
the dream of homeownership, is well beyond the reach of many working and middle-class families.   
A Joint Center for Housing Studies report (2009) found nearly 18 million households paid more than 
half their incomes for housing in 2007.  While low-income individuals and families can be most 
vulnerable to high housing costs, working households are not immune to the affordability crisis.  A 
recent study suggests that between 47 and 50 percent of working households earning up to 120 
percent of Area Median Income (AMI) experience moderate to severe housing cost burdens1 
(Wardrip 2009).   As employees, this category includes nurses, police officers, firefighters and service 
workers, often the core providers of “essential services” for a community.   As renters and 
homeowners, these workers are caught in an income-trap:  they make too much to qualify for 
government benefits and yet not enough to afford market-rate housing.     
                                                 
1
 Wardrip, Keith. (2009).  Of the 23 million working households with moderate to severe housing cost burdens, 
the narrow majority (52 percent) are homeowners.  
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Many municipalities have begun to notice their “essential” workers, who earn service-
economy wages, cannot afford to live in their communities’ average-priced homes.   Emerging 
research acknowledges the need for both rental and for-sale workforce housing (Haughey et al., 
2006).  Given the cultural entrenchment of homeownership as the American Dream, this paper will 
focus on the particular challenges of providing for-sale workforce housing.   Despite government 
policies supporting homeownership for low-and moderate-income families, public and private entities 
hoping to develop workforce housing often face tremendous barriers during the development process.   
Local government regulations, restricted access to public and private financing, and organizational 
inexperience can hinder workforce housing production, as evidenced by the proposed Pine Knolls 
Development in Chapel Hill, North Carolina.   The success of Pine Knolls Development and other 
workforce housing projects depends on strong public/private partnerships and the availability of 
flexible subsidies. 
 
  
CHAPTER 2 
DEFINING AFFORDABILITY FOR WORKFORCE HOUSING 
Researchers, policymakers and even the public often invoke the phrases “affordable housing” 
and “workforce housing” despite no universally accepted definitions.  The phrases are used so often 
to describe housing units, it is easy to forget what Stone (1999) said, “Affordable is not a 
characteristic of housing.  It is a relationship between housing and people” (p. 36).   To define this 
relationship, Stone (2006) states three critical questions that must be answered: 
• Affordable to whom? 
• By what standard of affordability? 
• For how long?   
 
For this paper’s purpose, housing affordability is defined as the relationship between moderate-
income, working households and the costs of homeownership under a commonly accepted indicator 
of affordability, the ratio of income to housing costs (Stone 2006).  The standard ratio is no more than 
30 percent of household income should be used to meet mortgage or rental payments plus utilities 
(Gunderson 2007).  For the maximum housing cost calculations within Pine Knolls case study, a 
front-end ratio of 30 percent (including mortgage, principal, taxes, insurance, and homeowners’ 
association dues but excluding utilities) is used.    
Who is “moderate-income,” however, when fully 80 percent of American self-identify as 
middle-, working-, and lower-income classes (Turnbull 2007, n.p.)?  Because the federal government 
has long used income to determine eligibility for subsidized housing2, its definitions will be used to 
                                                 
2
 Under federal statutory authority (U.S. Housing Act of 1937, as amended), the U.S. Department of Housing 
and Urban Development (HUD) annually establishes income limits for its federally-assisted housing projects.   
HUD’s income limits pertain primarily to its multi-family rental housing programs, including public housing 
and voucher programs.  The income limits also govern HUD programs that specifically target infrastructure 
redevelopment and affordable housing, including Community Development Block Grants (CDBG) and HOME 
Investment Partnerships (HOME) funds.    
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delineate “low-” from “moderate-” income households.   The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) calculates income limits using the U.S. Census data for median family income 
within metropolitan statistical areas and non-metropolitan housing markets. The geographically-based 
incomes are referred to as Area Median Income or AMI (Table 1).  Limits may be adjusted for 
particularly low or high-cost areas as well as for family size.    
Table 1:  Household income definitions  
Income Definition Income No Greater Than 
Extremely low income 30 percent of area median income 
Very low income 50 percent of area median income 
Low income 80 percent of area median income 
Moderate income 100 percent of area median income 
Moderate-high income 120 percent of area median income 
Source:  FY2009 Income Limits Briefing Materials, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 
HUD is mandated to calculate “low-,” “very low-,” and “extremely low-” income limits.   
“Low”-income refers to 80 percent of AMI and is the upper limit for nearly all federally subsidized 
rental and homeownership programs. Although HUD often scales AMI up to 140 percent to 
determine eligibility limits for some Federal Housing and Finance Agency mortgage programs, no 
hard statutory line defines “moderate”-income households.  Thus, the use of “moderate” and 
“moderate-high” incomes to define workforce housing in this paper is based on other researchers’ 
definitions (Olson 2005; Booza, Cutsinger, & Galster 2006) and will include households with 
incomes between 80 and 120 of AMI.  
 
  
CHAPTER 3 
THE CASE FOR WORKING FAMILIES 
While the national homeownership rate hit a record high 69 percent in 2004, homeownership 
was not achieved equally among households by income.   Just half of households in the lowest 
income quintile are homeowners, and homeownership rates for Hispanics and African-Americans are 
below 50 percent (Carasso, Bell, Olsen, & Steuerle 2005).    This discrepancy in homeownership 
opportunity is not surprising given the history of federal housing subsidies.  The federal government 
spent nearly $41 billion in 2005 on direct capital outlays for housing assistance, most of it on HUD 
rental programs like Section 8 and public housing serving very-low income households (Carasso et 
al., 2005).  Homeowners, by contrast, received about $147 billion in tax subsidies, including 
mortgage interest and property tax deduction.   Yet these tax benefits accrued overwhelmingly to 
high-income households because of their higher incomes and marginal tax rates.  As an Urban 
Institute report noted: 
Families in the second quarter of income distribution receive almost no subsidies – 
their income is too high for rent subsidies and too low to gain much from tax 
preferences….our patchwork of federal housing subsidy programs pays higher-
income households to own their homes while paying some low-income households to 
rent (Carasso et al., 2005). 
 
That many working families do not receive adequate subsidy to achieve homeownership troubles 
many government officials.  As HUD Secretary Henry Cisneros said, “Expanding homeownership is 
vitally important to our country because homeownership is critical to both individual economic 
opportunity and also to the building of strong communities” (1995, p. 6).   By understanding federal 
housing policy over the past 50 years and the rationale for pushing homeownership, one can see why 
moderate-income homeownership will be an important consideration for future administrations.  
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Federal Policy Overview 
The federal government set a goal in the Housing Act of 1949 to support “a decent home and 
suitable living environment for every American family.”   Much of the government’s early subsidies 
for housing were capital outlays to subsidize renters, builders or owners of rental housing (Carasso et 
al. 2005).   Often government financed and owned, early public housing programs sheltered more 
than 1 million households nationally (Schwartz 2009).  As favor for government-built public housing 
waned in the 1960s and 1970s, voucher and certificate programs grew.   Under the most prominent 
program, the Housing Choice Voucher Program (also referred to as Section 8), nearly 2 million 
households pay 30 percent of their income towards rent or less commonly mortgages, for private-
market housing units.  The federal government pays the difference up to the fair market rate3.   In the 
1980s, policy shifted once again to private production of rental units through the establishment of the 
Low Income Housing Tax Credit program (LIHTC), which provides incentives to builders through 
substantial tax credits and savings.   As with earlier federal housing programs, Section 8 vouchers and 
LIHTC-subsidized units target low-income households, with income limits of 80 percent and 60 
percent of AMI, respectively.   Moderate and moderate-high income households earn too much to 
qualify for rental assistance under these programs.  
Historically, the federal government’s programs for homeownership have received less direct 
outlay and have produced fewer units than its rental programs.  The largest homeownership programs 
include Section 235, Section 502, and HOME Investment Partnerships.  The Section 235 
Homeownership Program for Low-Income Households, begun in 1969, provided incentives such as 
low or no down payments and subsidized interest payments to roughly 500,000 households (Carasso 
et al., 2005).  After investing in areas with low property appreciation and households ill-equipped for 
homeownership, the program faltered and was eventually terminated.   The more successful Section 
502 Rural Home Ownership Direct Loan Program through the Department of Agriculture has lent 
                                                 
3
 “The FMR is the 40th percentile of gross rents for typical, non-substandard rental units occupied by recent 
movers in a local housing market” (24 CFR 888).  
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more than $51 billion to nearly 2 million households over the past 50 years (Carasso et al., 2005).    
The mortgage program targets low- and moderate-income households earning up to 115 percent of 
AMI.  
HOME Investment Partnerships is one of the few HUD program designed to provide 
subsidies for developers to build affordable housing for low-income households.  Similar to the 
popular Community Development Block Grants (CDBG), HOME funds are federal block grants 
allocated to local and state governments for administration.   Unlike CDBG, which can be used for 
acquisition and rehabilitation of existing housing as well as homebuyer down payment assistance but 
not new construction, HOME funds can be spent on any type of housing assistance (with restrictions), 
including the new construction of for-sale units.  While HOME allocates over $2 billion annually, the 
funds are targeted to households earning less than 80 percent AMI (60 percent of AMI for rental 
units).  Thus, workforce housing developers targeting moderate-income homebuyers are not able to 
access HOME funds, one of few federal subsidy sources for new construction. 
 Besides direct capital outlays, the federal government has supported homeownership through 
fiscal policy.  Since the early 1990s, efforts to promote low-income homeownership through lower 
borrowing costs have been politically and publicly popular (Belsky, Restinas, & Duda 2005).    
Currently, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, which oversees the Federal Home Loan Banks and 
now Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, targets affordable mortgage products to households earning up to 
140 percent of AMI.  It has established affordable lending goals for its mortgage products, backed by 
an implicit federal guarantee that reduce interest rates for low-income households.    Besides lower 
borrowing costs, moderate-income homebuyers often may finance most if not all of their down 
payments through a second mortgage.  With FHA loans, for example, purchasers may borrow up to 
96.5 percent of the costs of buying a home.   
 During this time, lenders also relaxed underwriting standards, providing more credit to a 
greater number of households.  Lower credit standards certainly contributed to the record US. 
homeownership rate in 2004, but the easy credit coupled with a burgeoning secondary market for 
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high-interest loans targeted at riskier borrowers led to rapid growth in subprime lending to low-
income households (Belsky et al., 2005).   The 2007-2010 housing crisis that stemmed from defaults 
on these risky loans, among other factors, may significantly impact the availability of low-cost 
financing for future low- and moderate-income buyers.   Whether favorable financing terms from 
FHFA will continue once the housing market stabilizes—and if expectations for rising interest rates 
come true—remains to be seen.  Many policymakers even question whether homeownership should 
continue to be federal, state and local governments’ predominant housing policy for low-income 
households below 80 percent of AMI.  That debate aside, one can reasonably expect the continued 
federal promotion of affordable for-sale housing to moderate-income, working families.  After all, 
historically the middle-class has been the principal beneficiaries of homeownership (Shlay 2006).  
 
Moderate-Income Homeownership:  Evaluating the Goal 
 
The original federal policy recommendations for increasing homeownership for low- and 
moderate-income homeowners were founded in the hope of reaping social, political and/or economic 
benefits.  In her critical analysis of recent housing policy, Anne B. Shlay (2006) surveys the academic 
literature to document low-income homeownership goals and the rationale behind them.   As Shlay 
highlights, the assumed social benefits of homeownership include greater family stability and civic 
participation as well as a perceived increase in control over one’s housing, which may increase self-
esteem (Deitz & Haurin 2003; Rohe & Stegman 1994). Living in owner-occupied households is also 
expected to improve physical and mental health of children, exemplified by positive behavioral 
outcomes such as decreased juvenile delinquency (Haurin, D., Dietz, & Haurin, J., 2002).    Because 
buying a home reflects a greater economic investment than renting, policymakers expect 
homeownership to produce positive effects including well-maintained neighborhoods, stabilized 
property values and fewer incidents of vandalism, blight, and abandonment (Haurin, Dietz, & 
Weinberg, 2003).   While research on the actual effects of homeownership show only weak evidence 
of different attitudes towards civic engagement between renters and owners (Rossi & Weber 1996), 
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other studies find significant neighborhood stability and property value appreciation from 
homeownership (Rohe & Stewart 1996).     
Granted, investing in homeownership may also come at a cost.  At the macro-level, 
homeownership may decrease residential mobility or lead to exclusionary behavior (Rohe, Van 
Zandt, & McCarthy 2000).  Another risk is depreciating property values, especially during a recession 
when a homeowner may owe more on his mortgage than the value of the underlying property.  A 
homeowner also risks missing loan payments as a result of what Restinas & Belsky (2005) terms 
income shock (lost wages or job) or budget shock (unanticipated home repair or replacement or large 
medical or transportation bills).  Such payment delinquencies may lead to default, which can reduce 
one’s credit score and increase future borrowing costs.  Furthermore, an unsophisticated homeowner 
may lose money by not holding the asset long enough to recoup transaction costs, such as attorney’s 
fees, from buying and selling too soon.   
Speaking generally however, homeownership provides a financial benefit to low- and 
moderate-income buyers.  Benefits flow to homeowners primarily through a favorable tax system.  
First, a homeowner builds equity as he make principal payments towards his mortgages.  Second, 
homeowners receive government supported tax breaks through interest payment and property tax 
deductions that essentially reduce their effective tax rate.  Third, most homeowners do not pay tax on 
the capital gains from the resale of their home.  These tax savings for all households total about $147 
billion annually and more than 3.5 times the federal government’s direct subsidy outlays for low-
income housing (Carasso et al., 2005).  Evidence also suggests property appreciation rates for lower-
valued housing – typically occupied by low- and moderate-income households – generally equals 
appreciation for higher-valued housing (Pollakowski, Stegman, & Rohe 1991).   This price 
appreciation across property values suggests positive investment returns for moderate-income 
homeowners.  Belsky et al. (2005) evaluated the effects of mortgage interest rates, refinance behavior 
and tax policies on low-income homeowners.  The study found that low-income homeowners are 
more likely to take out higher interest rate loans and less likely to refinance.  Educating homeowners, 
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however, about avoiding subprime loans and refinancing mortgages when it is beneficial to do so can 
improve their returns significantly.  
Thus, homeownership can be an effective asset-building strategy, particularly for low-income 
households who tend to use home equity as their principal source of saving (Restinas & Belsky 
2002).  In fact, even most middle-income households’ home equity exceeds assets held in retirement 
plans such as 401Ks and other investments like stocks and bonds (Carasso et al., 2005).  Granted, the 
current economic crisis characterized by a national decline in property values (Case 2010) may have 
had disparate impacts on property owned by lower and higher-income households, attenuating 
homeownership’s merits for asset-building.   As more property sales data becomes available, research 
into recent rates of return among property values of all levels will emerge.   
Meanwhile, the national decline in median home sales from $221,900 in 2006 to $165,100 in 
February 2010 (National Association of Realtors) has prompted critics to assume the foreclosure 
crisis has lessened the nation’s affordable housing crisis.  A recent study by the Center for Housing 
Policy noted that while the ratio of home prices to income has fallen, housing costs have not declined 
for homeowners or renters (Wardrip 2009).  In fact, housing costs have risen largely because of 
growing utility costs and demand for multifamily housing as homeowners displaced by foreclosure 
enter the rental market. Thus, acute demand for workforce housing continues.  How the government 
chooses to allocate scare resources between low and moderate-income households and between 
affordable rental and homeownership opportunities is of critical importance. 
 
  
CHAPTER 4 
BARRIERS IN AFFORDABLE HOUSING DEVELOPMENT 
No one knows for certain how many renters would prefer to own their own home but cannot buy a 
home because of serious barriers (Carasso et al., 2005, p. 6).    High housing costs for many working 
families suggests demand for affordable homeownership opportunities.  A shortage of affordable 
housing stock creates supply-side constraints that filtering—the process of aging and deteriorating 
housing stock moving from higher to lower-income households—cannot fully solve (Collins, Crowe, 
& Carliner 2002).   Because existing housing stock ages and needs to be replaced and the nation’s 
population continues to grow, the supply of housing units affordable to moderate-income homebuyers 
must also increase.  Yet private and non-profit organizations seizing the opportunity to develop safe, 
decent, low-cost workforce housing to meet market demand find themselves facing multiple 
challenges from pre-development planning issues to land and construction costs to financing to 
securing qualified buyers.    
 The development process may take years to complete, each stage containing risks that can 
derail the entire project.   Development is capital intensive; one pays for land, hard construction costs, 
and soft costs like permits, architects, engineers, appraisers, and financing.   Because most non-profit 
organizations do not have sufficient cash to finance housing projects internally, they must secure 
capital from external sources.   Many banks and even private foundations will not lend to non-profit 
organizations, however, because non-profit organizations often lack strong balance sheets and enough 
capital reserves to secure or guarantee the lender’s investment (Enterprise 2007). By contrast, many 
private developers have sufficient capital and access to collateral and other guarantees.  Yet 
affordable housing tends to offer low profit margins, creating a disincentive for private developers to 
provide below-market rate units in the absence of public incentives.   Even if developers were 
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attracted to a project, workforce housing projects often require equity investments of less than $10 
million, which excludes them from institutional capital markets funded by pension funds, insurance 
companies and other large investors typically looking to invest $15 million or more (Rosenthal & 
Stark 2005).    Smaller community banks may be able to handle smaller construction loans but are 
unwilling to invest due to a perceived higher risk in lending to workforce housing projects.  Risk 
includes the financial risk of lending to an unproven or undercapitalized developer; construction risk 
due to not finishing a project on-time or on-budget;  and market risk resulting from a lack of qualified 
buyers, whose sale proceeds play a vital role in paying off the lender’s construction loan.    
Also, both private and non-profit organizations face high barriers to entry, especially in local 
markets with rapidly appreciating property values. In the development budget, land is typically the 
second biggest line item after hard construction costs (Foong 2008).   As a California Roundtable 
Report (2002) said: 
The truth is the single most significant factor affecting property values is the pre-
existing value of the land in a given community or area.  This in turn is based on 
supply and demand, proximity to major urban centers, nearby attractions (beachfront 
property, panoramic views), and negative factors such as environmental 
contaminants, and availability of adequate infrastructure and services (p. 5). 
 
Without public support to facilitate the acquisition and disposal of vacant, blighted or government-
owned land to affordable housing developers at below-market rates, developers often cannot make the 
project financially feasible.   Federally funded Community Development Block Grants may be used 
for land acquisition and infrastructure improvements.  The similarly structured HOME program may 
be used for new construction costs as well as down payment assistance.  These federal funds are 
restricted, however, to serving households with incomes below 80 percent of AMI.  The lack of 
funding available to workforce housing projects serving households between 80 and 120 percent of 
AMI presents a serious obstacle for developers.     
Barriers to workforce housing production also occur when developers seek assistance from local 
governments.   Many communities have strict zoning and subdivision ordinances that may discourage 
the development of multifamily housing or make approval a lengthy process that few organizations 
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have enough resources to sustain.  Another obstacle may rise because of institutional divisions within 
local government between traditional planning and community development departments.   For 
example, one study found that “few local governments correlate policy initiatives in their 
comprehensive plans with housing and development policies with their respective HUD Consolidated 
Plans,” creating fragmented programs with conflicting policies (Hosford 2009).    Even when 
governments promote workforce housing, Lake (1993) demonstrated that negative externalities from 
development make local residents protective of their property.  The negative externalities—including 
pollution, noise and traffic—foster not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY) opposition to proposed projects. 
Developers may also have trouble finding qualified buyers who can secure sufficient financing.   
Low-and moderate-income home buyers tend to have lower credit scores, which can elevate a 
household’s financing costs and lower the total monthly payment it can financially support.  The 
inability of local government and community groups to provide down-payment assistance, low-cost 
mortgages, and homebuyer education to a broad group of potential homebuyers creates market risk 
and is an obstacle for developers (Enterprise 2007; Belsky et al., 2005).  Neither the developer nor the 
community wins if homeowners receive financial products at greater than justified cost, increasing 
their risk of default and losing their home. 
 
  
CHAPTER 5 
CASE STUDY:  PROPOSED PINE KNOLLS DEVELOPMENT 
In practice, how difficult is it for private developers and non-profit organizations to provide 
affordable homeownership opportunities for moderate-income households?    To answer this question, 
presented below is a case study, including financial analysis of a moderate-income housing project.    
Pines Community Center, Inc. (PCC) is one non-profit organization planning to develop a 
workforce housing project in Chapel Hill, North Carolina.  Currently celebrating its forty-second year 
of operations, PCC’s mission is “to promote and protect a positive quality of life in Pine Knolls 
Development,” a historically African-American neighborhood (Pines Community Center, ¶ 3).   
During its history, PCC has managed an affordable housing program for renters and buyers, provided 
summer and after-school programs for youth, and organized support for neighborhood preservation.    
Led by PCC President Ted Parrish, the nonprofit has initiated planning and predevelopment work for 
a proposed 31-unit subdivision within the Pine Knolls neighborhood.   PCC’s development will target 
moderate-income homebuyers with incomes between 80 percent and 120 percent of AMI.  The 
nonprofit also is exploring an option to retain up to 25 percent of the units as rental housing targeted 
at families earning less than 60 percent of AMI.  
 
Market Overview 
Besides being home to the University of North Carolina’s flagship campus, Chapel Hill has one of the 
most expensive housing markets in the Triangle, a combined statistical area including nearby cities 
Raleigh, Durham, and Cary.   Attracted to the Triangle area for its strong employment outlook and 
moderate climate, new residents are expected to increase the area’s population by 5 percent within the 
next five years, according to US Census Bureau projections.  The strong demand for housing has 
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pushed the price of the average home sold in the Durham metropolitan statistical area (MSA), which 
includes Chapel Hill, well above essential and service employees’ incomes.  According to the Center 
for Housing Policy, a household needs to earn nearly $55,000 annually to afford the MSA’s median 
home price, $168,000.   Typical professions eligible for workforce housing, including teachers and 
janitors, all earn less than the minimum income required for owning a home at the median price 
(Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Need for workforce housing in Durham MSA* 
 
*Includes Orange County (Town of Chapel Hill) 
Source:  Center for Housing Policy, “Paycheck to Paycheck” 
 
Potential moderate-income homebuyers in Chapel Hill face even higher housing costs than in 
the overall Durham MSA.  By 2006, the average home in Chapel Hill—including single family, 
townhomes, and condominium units—sold for $387,452, up 48 percent since 2000 [Town of Chapel 
Hill 2007].    Concerned about the lack of housing supply for working individuals and families, the 
Town of Chapel Hill (TOCH) amended its comprehensive plan ten years ago to encourage developers 
building five or more new units to set aside at least 15 percent of them as affordable to households 
earning below 80 percent of AMI or make a payment-in-lieu to a housing trust fund.   TOCH 
concluded only a quarter of housing units sold within the Town’s zip codes were affordable to 
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households earning less than the area median income or $65,500 in 2009.   While the affordable 
housing policy adopted a decade ago encouraged new developments to include moderately-priced 
units, the subsequent mix of housing offered by developers – mostly 1 or 2 bedroom condos – did 
little to help working families achieve homeownership.   
Consequently, TOCH currently is reviewing a draft inclusionary zoning ordinance to require 
all developers to provide expanded affordable housing options for residents in exchange for density 
bonuses.  Unfortunately, the proposed ordinance requires the units to be set-aside as affordable 
housing to target only low-income households below 80 percent of AMI.  TOCH still faces a critical 
shortage of homeownership opportunities for working families with moderate to moderate-high 
incomes. 
 
Site Overview 
The proposed affordable housing site is located at the intersection of South Merritt Mill Road and 
Park Road in Chapel Hill.  The parcels are zoned medium density residential – up to 7 units per acre – 
and are part of a neighborhood conservation overlay district. Not far from the site’s northern 
boundary lies neighboring Carrboro’s town limit.  Less than a mile northeast sits downtown Chapel 
Hill, including restaurants and retail shops.   The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and 
UNC-affiliated hospitals, both major area employers, are also nearby.  North Carolina State Highway 
54 is within a half-mile of the site and gives residents access to I-40 and beyond, including Durham, 
Raleigh, and Research Triangle Park (Figure 2). 
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Figure 2 – Overview map of proposed Pine Knolls Development 
 
Source:  Google Maps  
 
The Pine Knolls neighborhood differs demographically from the Town of Chapel Hill (Table 
2).  Pine Knolls’ non-white, non-Hispanic population is nearly 67 percent, while just 32 percent of 
TOCH is non-white.  This difference reflects Pine Knolls’ history as a neighborhood for African-
American and black families. While Pine Knolls’ median household income trails the Town’s by 
approximately $5,000, the percentage of owner-occupied housing units in Pine Knolls nearly reaches 
the TOCH’s homeownership rate.  Still, at 45 and 47 percent respectively, both the neighborhood and 
the Town’s homeownership rates trail the national average.   This disproportionately high number of 
renters in Chapel Hill may be attributed to its status as a college town with a large resident student 
population.  Still, the remarkably low homeownership rate suggests latent demand for below-market 
rate for-sale housing units. 
Table 2: Town of Chapel Hill and Pine Knolls neighborhood demographics 
 Pine Knolls* Chapel Hill U.S.  
Population 1,097 49,629 305,548,770 
Households 500 23,827 118,000,003 
% Owner-Occupied Housing Units 44.6% 46.5% 67.7% 
% Non-white Residents 66.8% 32.3% 27.5% 
Median HH Income $45,714  $51,690  $54,180  
Source:  US Census Bureau 2009 Estimates   *Based on Block Group 0107022, Orange County, NC.    
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Site History 
According to Orange County Land Records, PCC originally acquired four parcels totaling 9.20 acres 
of land in 1995 for $368,500, financed by Central Carolina Bank and the Town of Chapel Hill.   The 
Town loaned PCC $115,000 from the Town’s Housing Loan Trust Fund, which was due and payable 
to the Town in 1997, according to a memorandum to the Mayor and Town Council from W. Calvin 
Horton, then Town Manager (September 11, 2000).  After acquisition, PCC developed a couple of 
lots as affordable for-sale housing, using sweat-equity from the homebuyer – essentially his or her 
time and labor – to reduce costs.  Most of the site remained vacant, however. 
By 2000, PCC still owed the Housing Loan Trust Fund $109,250—nearly its original 
balance— and the Council was considering initiating foreclosure proceedings.   First Baptist Church 
approached the Town Council and proposed purchasing 6 acres of the site to build Manley Estates, a 
HUD Section 202 elderly housing project with 40 one-bedroom rental housing units.   The land sold 
that year for $336,000, which repaid the loan from Central Carolina Bank and reduced the Town’s 
lien against the property to $54,000.   According to Chapel Hill News, Ted Parrish and PCC cured the 
Town’s lien in October 2007, giving the nonprofit organization unencumbered ownership of the land 
(Decanto  2007, p. A1).     
While it may be difficult for non-profit organizations like PCC to obtain land free and clear, 
owning property outright can be a key determinant of project feasibility.  Generally, land costs ranks 
second only to hard construction costs in budgets for affordable housing developments.  As developer 
Bruce Dorfman said, “By eliminating the land cost, you are eliminating as much as 25 to 35 percent 
of the total [development] budget” (Foong 2008).  That savings acts as a subsidy to reduce the homes’ 
selling price, an important factor to be discussed further.  
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Figure 3 – Parcel map of proposed Pine Knolls development site  
 
Source:  Orange County NC Interactive GIS 
 
To efficiently develop the 3.32 acres of land currently owned by PCC, the nonprofit 
organization will need to add a second parcel totaling .17 acres, which forms a “keyhole” into the 
main parcel off of Park Road (see Figure 3).   PCC previously owned this parcel and its 
improvements, including a 3-bedroom, 2-bath single-family house, before selling it to a low-income 
homebuyer.   PCC plans to relocate the house within the site with the cooperation of its owners.  
 
Zoning Regulations 
According to the Town of Chapel Hill’s Land Use Management Ordinance, the site is currently zoned 
R-3, a medium density residential designation permitting up to 7 units per acre.  R-3 zoning continues 
North and Northeast along Merritt Mill Road, while the site is surrounded by more intensive 
residential zoning (R-4) on adjacent properties to the South and Southeast.   Further away are lower-
density residential neighborhoods comprised of single-family houses and duplexes.  Currently, R-3 
zoning does not permit multi-family attached townhomes, PCC’s proposed building type.  In addition 
to rezoning the site, the developer will need to obtain a special use permit, which TOCH requires for 
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all projects disturbing more than 20,000 square feet of land.   The entitlement process may take 
between 18-36 months, depending upon the timing of required applications and public hearings.  
Figure 4:  Pine Knolls Neighborhood Conservation District 
 
Source: Town of Chapel Hill  
In 2005, Pine Knolls Neighborhood residents approached the Town of Chapel Hill concerned 
about recent development activity that converted the neighborhood’s characteristically modest homes 
into duplexes, an effort to attract university students as renters.   In response, the Town approved an 
overlay zoning district for the Pine Knolls Neighborhood.  The overlay district, formally known as the 
Pine Knolls Conservation District, establishes “special regulations especially designed for and 
intended to help preserve the character of a particular, older residential neighborhood” (Town of 
Chapel Hill 2006), (Figure 4).  While the Pine Knolls Conservation District’s specific regulations on 
building height, floor-area regulations, etc. apply only to single-family development, the 
accompanying design guidelines detail the Town of Chapel Hill’s preferences for parking, fencing 
21 
 
and landscaping.   Given the proposed Pine Knolls Townhomes’ location within this neighborhood 
conservation district, PCC should be mindful of these recommendations when initiating its design 
drawings.  By gaining community support for design schematics early, PCC can reduce carrying costs 
resulting from a lengthy entitlement process.  
 
Financial Analysis 
An analysis of Pine Knolls Townhomes’ development budget demonstrates the importance of 
subsidies to the financial feasibility of workforce housing projects.  PCC owns the proposed site for 
the 31-townhome project and consequently does not need to pay land acquisition costs.  Even with 
this substantial saving, the project is expected to cost approximately $5.5 million or $178,000 per unit 
(Appendix I).   This sum incorporates hard construction costs of approximately $100 per SF for a mix 
of 2, 3, and 4 bedroom units that are 1,300 square feet on average.  Total development costs also 
include general requirements, builder’s profit and overhead, and a 5 percent contingency reserve to 
mitigate risk of cost overruns.  Remaining use of funds fall into three categories:  predevelopment 
work (architecture, engineering fees);   financing costs (construction loan interest); and other soft 
costs (legal fees, permits, marketing).   
The project will rely on home sales to generate revenue to pay down the construction loan.  
The 2009 median household income for a family of four in the Durham MSA is $65,500.  Assuming a 
5 percent down payment on a 30-year fixed rate mortgage at 7.25 percent interest, property taxes, 
insurance and a $100 monthly homeowners’ association fee to cover ongoing maintenance for 
common areas, a homebuyer earning the median area income may afford a maximum housing price 
of approximately $160,000 (Appendix III).   PCC would like to target homebuyers earning 80 to 120 
of AMI. Therefore, homes will have a range of price points above and below $160,000 depending 
upon the mix of bedroom-sizes built and targeted income and household size.  As the townhomes’ 
sale prices approach the maximum affordable to moderate-income households, the market of potential 
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homebuyers narrows.     To more steeply discount offering prices, the project will require additional 
subsidies. 
If the proposed townhomes sell for $160,000 on average, the sales will generate 
approximately $4.7 million in revenues to offset development costs. This revenue is insufficient, 
however, to cover all development costs, including interim financing.   The project’s budget deficit 
totals approximately $800,000 (Appendix II).  This deficit means each unit needs an additional 
$26,000 for the project to break even.  Without additional public or private subsidies, the Pine Knolls 
Development is financially infeasible, and the community loses an opportunity to provide affordable 
homeownership for working families. 
 
  
CHAPTER 6 
RECOMMEDATIONS FOR SUCCESS 
Affordable housing developers like Pine Knolls Community Center can achieve homeownership 
opportunities for workforce housing.   Success will depend, however, on the organizations’ 
willingness and ability to forge new public and private partnerships and explore alternative financing 
models.    
The creation of public/private partnerships can foster affordable housing development by 
effectively allowing each partner to provide complementary skills (Haughey et al., 2006).  The public 
sector can remove barriers to the development process and facilitate low-cost financing and direct 
subsidies for affordable housing developers.   For example, governments can implement inclusionary 
zoning regulations to require all developers to set aside a certain percentage of new construction for 
moderate-income households in exchange for more lenient zoning laws for density and building 
height.  Under this approach, increased density generates additional revenue from more market-rate 
units to offset development costs incurred building below-market rate units.   The success of higher 
density, mixed-income developments has already been demonstrated (Haughey et al., 2006; ULI 
2009).  Studies of thriving mixed-income developments suggest key determinants of success include 
superior location, comparable quality between subsidized and market rate units, and attractive design 
to attract renters and homebuyers with many housing choices (Brophy & Smith 1997).  Analysis of 
data from HUD’s HOPE VI program, which aimed to end the concentration of low-income housing in 
aging public housing stock by providing new housing options targeted at renters and homebuyers of 
varying income levels, has shown the importance of creating a critical mass of market units – at least 
30 percent – in workforce housing developments to foster economically integrated neighborhoods 
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(ULI 2009).   Public/private partnerships can support the development of workforce housing 
units by bringing additional resources and political support to the entitlement process.  
The public must also advocate for private and additional public resources to increase access 
to housing targeted at moderate-income households earning between 80 and 120 percent of AMI.   
The precedent has already been set: nearly all low-income housing developments require creative 
financing through multi-layered subsidies.  This creative financing may include tax credits, 
permanent loans, deferred payment and/or interest loans, grants, voucher subsidies, and deferred 
developers’ fees. But because the federal government caps CDBG and HOME block grants as well as 
Section 8 vouchers to households at 80 percent of AMI or below, local and state governments will 
need to set up and fund housing programs and trusts with higher income restrictions than the typical 
80 percent of AMI.  In the Pine Knolls Development case, the Town of Chapel Hill has already 
established a housing loan trust fund to supplement federal resources.  The fund is restricted, 
however, to projects serving households with incomes below 80 percent of AMI.   To fund workforce 
housing projects like Pine Knolls Development, the program’s income restrictions will need to be 
raised.  Alternatively, state governments can create programs to fill this financing need.  Community 
Workforce Housing Innovation Pilot Program initiated in Florida in 2006, for example, funded 
$112.5 million in low-interest and forgivable loans to affordable housing developers producing units 
targeted at households earning up to 140 percent of AMI.    Participating developers could receive up 
to $5 million per project if they pledged to leverage additional public and private resources (ULI July 
2009).  Due to its flexible income limits, the funding provided essential subsidy to make 
homeownership viable for working families.  The state estimates that the two-year program will 
generate 1,589 homeownership units and 337 rental units for working, middle-income families.  An 
alternative approach to filling the subsidy gap is to subsidize the homebuyers.  For example, 
organizations and governments may provide moderate-income homebuyers with second and third 
deferred interest mortgages that allow them to pay a higher purchase price than they for which they 
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would typically qualify.  These “soft” loans are either forgiven after homeowners meet minimum 
occupancy requirements, say 10 years, or are not repaid until the property is resold.   
Local and state governments may also work with the private sector to leverage investment 
from unexpected sources.  Phoenix Realty Group has created a model to bridge the subsidy gap and 
fund “middle-sized investments for middle-sized housing projects for middle-income people” by 
raising funds from the California Public Employees Retirement Fund (Rosenthal & Stark 2005).  By 
finding investors willing to look at the “double bottom line” of social and financial returns, 
developers can attract additional resources, notably equity with a lower required rate of return. 
Even if public funding for workforce housing is not available, local communities can help 
affordable housing developments through policy changes.  For example, a local government can 
initiate an expedited review process for zoning approval to reduce developers’ carrying costs 
(insurance, taxes, bridge loan interest) during the predevelopment and planning phase.  For non-profit 
developers in particular, local governments may help non-profit organizations’ financial position by 
delaying upfront hits to cash flow during the development timeline.  A town may, for instance, defer 
permit and impact fees until a certificate of occupancy is issued (Gunderson 2007).     
Partnering with a community land trust (CLT) is another way local governments can 
alternatively finance affordable housing by reusing vacant, abandoned or blighted property.   A CLT 
is a non-profit organization that acquires and holds land as open space for future development, 
eventually leasing land to a third party who builds housing and then leases or sales the improvements 
to income qualified renters or home buyers (Enterprise 2007).   Benefits include reduced development 
and carrying costs (property taxes, maintenance, etc.), as the CLT usually acquires and leases the land 
at little or no cost.  As shown in Pine Knolls Development, saving on land costs can make a big 
difference in total development costs per unit.  
 Developers should also explore ways they can reduce development costs and subsequently, 
their need for subsidy.   At the project level, a developer can mitigate interest-rate risk during 
construction and lease-up by underwriting project at 100 basis points higher than current market 
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interest rates (Rosenthal & Stark 2005).  They can also reduce construction risk by using bonded 
contractors, funding sufficient contingency reserves and entering guaranteed maximum price 
contracts with builders.  To ensure qualified homebuyers, developers can partner with government 
and community-based programs offering both pre- and post-purchase homebuyer education courses.  
If an area has a lack of qualified homebuyers due to poor credit and little or no savings, an 
organization may also explore alternative financing models.   The recent foreclosure crisis has created 
renewed interest in lease-purchase programs in particular.   Under lease-purchase, an organization 
develops and leases a home to a family for a set time period, usually 2-5 years.  During this period, 
the family receives financial literacy and homebuyer education courses while working on improving 
its credit and saving a down payment, with the goal of purchasing the home from the sponsor.   
Benefits for the sponsoring organization include access to subsidy and equity sources set aside for 
rental housing.  Organizations should be cautious, however, if they do not have extensive property 
management experience or access to capital reserves, as the model involves significant risk of default 
(Enterprise 2007).  Still, the model may be appropriate in some situations. 
 
  
CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
As the availability of housing affordable to essential service workers continues to decline in 
many local markets, more communities will realize a need to provide reasonably-priced homes to 
retain middle-class employees.  Pine Knolls Development demonstrates that filling that gap with for-
sale housing units targeted at working families is often not financially feasible without additional 
subsidy to the developer or homebuyer.  Given that the subsidy gap is relatively small – just $26,000 
per unit in Pine Knolls’ case – innovative organizations can find ways to lower costs or increase 
financial support through public/private partnerships and alternative financing mechanisms.   Federal 
programs like HOME and local programs like the Town of Chapel Hill’s Housing Loan Trust Fund 
already exist to serve low-income households.  Changing income restrictions for existing programs 
can provide the vital subsidy needed for moderate-income workforce housing projects.  
 Of course, creating homeownership opportunities for working families engenders policy 
implications for how to allocate scarce resources.  Should funding provide housing for the most needy 
or allow for flexibility?  What should be done to help working families in high-cost areas, where a 
greater proportion of the population is at risk of finding no affordable housing?  While no easy 
answer exists, it is clear the federal government has a legacy of providing direct outlays to help low-
income families with rental assistance and tax subsidies to assist with middle-to-high income families 
with homeownership.     If current housing production programs can be expanded and new funding 
opportunities can be formed, more working families will have an opportunity to own their own home.  
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Appendix I:   
Pine Knolls Development Budget 
 
 
DEVELOPMENT BUDGET
ACQUISITION
Building Acquisition -$                    
Land Acquisition -$                    
Transaction Costs -$                    
REHABILITATION -$                    
UNIT CONSTRUCTION ($100 per SF) 4,085,800$           
OTHER CONSTRUCTION
General Requirements, Builder's Profit 
& Overhead 408,580$             
Landscaping 7,750$                 
Permits 48,041$               
Utility Connections & Tap Fees 6,913$                 
Contingency 207,425$             
INFRASTRUCTURE
Site Improvements 75,000$               
Water and Sewer 3,906$                 
Impact Fees 65,100$               
SOFT COSTS 
Site Planning 68,150$               
Approval Application Fees 43,782$               
Architecture & Engineering 62,000$               
Market Study and Appraisals -$                    
Environmental Review 5,000$                 
Insurance (Builders Risk) -$                    
FINANCE COSTS
Acquisition/Construction Loan Interest 151,044$             
Construction Origination -$                    
MARKETING AND OTHER COSTS
Marketing 2,500$                 
Closing Docs and Deed Stamps -$                    
Construction Period Insurance -$                    
Property Taxes -$                    
DEVELOPER FEE 5% 275,842$             
TOTAL DEVELOPMENT COST 5,516,833$           
Per Unit 177,962$             
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Appendix II:   
Pine Knolls Development Sources and Uses 
 
 
 
SOURCES:  REVENUE
Average SF # Units Total Revenue Revenue Per Unit
1,300 31 4,960,000$        160,000$                
Less Selling Costs 5% 248,000$          8,000$                   
TOTAL SOURCES 4,712,000$     152,000$              
USES:  COSTS Total Per Unit
Property Acquisition -$                 -$                      
Unit Construction 4,085,800$        131,800$                
Other Construction (including contingency) 678,709$          21,894$                  
Infrastructure 144,006$          4,645$                   
Planning/Architecture/Engineering 178,932$          5,772$                   
Construction Interest/Origination 151,044$          4,872$                   
Other Soft Costs -$                 -$                      
Marketing and Sales Costs 2,500$              81$                        
Developer Fee 275,842$          8,898$                   
TOTAL USES 5,516,833$     177,962$              
Total  Per Unit
REVENUE FROM SALE OF HOMES 4,712,000$        152,000$                
 -  TOTAL COSTS   (5,516,833)$       (177,962)$               
 = NET REVENUE (LOSS) (804,833)$         (25,962)$                
DEVELOPMENT SUBSIDY NEEDED 804,833$        25,962$                
New Construction
2-4 bdrm, 2-2.5 bath
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Appendix III:   
Pine Knolls Development Homebuyer Analysis 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bank Requirements Family Information
Bank Ratio Front End 30% Annual Income $65,500
Back End 40% Annual Taxes $4,313
Annual Interest Rate 7.25% Annual Insurance $1,000
Loan Term (Years) 30 Total Credit Card Debt $0
Loan to Value 95%
Closing Costs $3,000
Debt Capacity
   Monthly Income x Front Ratio 1,637.50$                   Debt Service for Loan Using LVR
 - Taxes 359.43$                   + Monthly Taxes
 - Insurance 83.33$                     + Monthly Insurance                  
 - Other Monthly Housing Cost (HOA fees) 100.00$                   = Monthly Mortgage Payment
Maximum Monthly Debt Service 1,094.74$                
MAXIMUM LOAN USING FRONT END RATIO 160,478$               
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